Commensurability-Translation of Justice: Plato and Confucius

The just man is not the product of a day, but of a long brooding and a painful birth. To become a power for peace, a man must first pass through experiences which lead him to see things in their different aspects: it is necessary that he have a wide horizon, and breathe various atmospheres–in a word, from crossing, one after another, paths and points of view the most diverse, and sometimes the most contradictory, he must acquire the faculty of putting himself in the place of others and appreciating them.
-Charles Wagner

Concepts are immaterial and yet can be felt. Concepts hold no weight yet can move mountains. Concept does not have a army, but can injure more beings than any other force. To bind concept within space and time is to limit the ontology of concept to rather superficial levels of understanding. The purity of concept is the greatest communication tool that the human-person possesses, as it transmits from the true form (of concept) to ascribe rungs which can be used to ‘climb out of the cave’ of relativism. The metaphysical nature of a concept allows it to be transmitted and transferred across the whole of humanity. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate the commensurability of the concept of Justice, synthesized using the the writings by two pinnacles of political thought, Plato and Confucius.

Concept:
One has heard the saying, ‘words are the worst form of expression that we have’. The beauty of this definition directs the teleological nature of words (language) upwards, to derive their meaning & power from the purity of concept. This animation through concept, gives even the most guttural of sounds and objects meaning. The concept thereby, could be stated as the “true language”, the language which (a priori) animates all language. Professor Walter Benjamin states upon this phenomenon (of purity of concept) in The Translators Task thusly,
In fact, this representation of the intended object by means of a incomplete form or seed of its production is a very special mode of representation seldom to be encounter in the domain of a non-linguistic life. For in analogies and signs non-linguistic life has types of reference other than intensive, that is anticipatory, intimating realization – this imagined, inner relationship among languages is, however of special convergence. It consists in the fact that languages are not aliens to each other, but a priori, and independently of all historical connection, related to each other in what they want to say (p. 154-155).
The location of the concept within the metaphysical confines (of the human-person) leads it to be accessed to any (whom) is capable to recognize it as such. This directly dissolves the argument of ‘least- common denominator” as the root of commensurability becomes the human-being through access to the concept (via processes of knowledge/understanding). Hence, with the (metaphysical) human as the root, concept can thereby be deducted back into any such human; ensuring both commensurability and translation of concept among human-persons across contextual boundaries . This leads to the to totality of concept being accessible to the agency of the human conscious (via mechanisms of learning). It is a teleological process, in such that the human-person, through a process, arrives both to the state of pure concept and then derives meaning back down to the material, bypassing horizontal clefts (of contextual barriers); or as Professor Benjamin more eloquently puts, “ the translator’s task consists in this: to find the intention toward the language into which the work is to be translated, on the basis of which an echo of the original can be awakened in it” (159).

A Definition of Justice:
Justice is one of the most ill-defined notions of description that can exist as codification in language. Defined in many dictionaries as simply ‘the state of being just’, one is hard-pressed to find another concept which uses itself for the basis for its own definition, its own existence. The definition that this paper uses (from the deduction of concept authored via Plato and Confucius) is of justice as being: the appropriate response (or balanced rectification) to a violation of natural law. The violation of natural law could then be stated as then a human-persons(s) whom is imbalanced (of essence) or made imbalanced. This violation (of natural law) is a violation of the true language, a disparage of the purity (totality) of human nature. It is towards nature that justice is seeking its rectification towards. Natural law therefore becomes the standard as to what one should calibrate one’s actions towards, justice merely being the mechanism of. Natural law (deduced from the authors) becomes an epistemic form, it becomes the total-origin. This notion of balance is that of properly proportional humors (or essences) of reason, of appetite, of spirit, in application/resolve for an appropriate imbalance of said humors; with the inverse, of disorder, thereby becoming akin to the notion of un-justice. In great cross-over between the two aforementioned authors is the predominance of Natural law; the notion that Natural law is the telos as to which justice is aiming in rectification towards. Platonic Justice again reverberates within the same logos as that of Confucian logic; Professor Domanski in The quest for justice in Plato’s Republic, states along this reasoning thusly,
Closely allied to justice is the concept of natural law. The works of Plato are, the Bible excepted, the greatest repository of natural law in the Western canon. According to the classical view, natural law is one, perennial, absolute, immutable (page 337).
Nonewithstanding, Confucian logos follows that of natural (or innate perfection) of (balanced) human nature, startling in the Analects, “it is by nature that we are close to each other, but by habit (via experience we become far from each other (Cheng, 349). In short, both authors direct the teleological nature of justice upwards, to the purity of balance, of the natural human.

Confucius:
“Acting in the world, the gentleman has no predisposition for or against anything (…) he merely seeks to be on the side of what is right (yi) (4.10 Analects- p 103 Slingerland, 2001). The stressed variable by both authors (Confucius and Plato) is the application of justice as a spectrum, justice as an inherently (teleological) balancing force. This notion of justice as a tool involves the knowledge of the totality of both ‘good and evil’.To break apart this false-dichotomy is the core facet of these two great authors, it is not the notion of ‘evil’ that one is attacking, but rather the notion of ‘disorder’. What is ‘right’ is the application of a dynamic nature; of (yi) being what justice is synonymous too. Taken as action of rectification (Zhengyi, Cheng. p 353), of which arrives back into the balance of natural essences. The requirement of this “predisposition for nor against any-one-thing” is not the notion of ‘impartiality’, but rather the possession of the totality of actions available to discern the one which leads towards rectification (of said violation) (yi). In Professor Chung-Ying Cheng’s translational analysis, he states that Confucius maintains (in the Zhong Yong),
that human nature is composed of central tendencies toward feelings such as joy, anger, sorrow, and well-being. It is in a state of equilibrium before these roots of feelings are activated. But when we are confronted with real concrete life situations, our feelings are released in response to those situations. If these feelings meet the goal of life in those situations, it leads to a harmony between the inner and the outer; if not, disorder and dissonance will result to the detriment of peace and justice in the society (350).

This quote imparts within us the telos of human person as “harmony between the inner and outer”. The definition of justice can also be deduced from the above argument, taken as the process via “equilibrium of tendencies”. Justice becomes not the end-goal but rather,“will rule as a means to achieve it the supreme good willed by the benevolence (ren) (ibid). Professor Cheng concludes, “It takes an onto- ethical position with regard to the rise of morality and law and takes the morality as the irreducible basis for reason and law” (ibid). This irreducible force (of agent-morale) is further explained within this work as the origins of justice, or rather ‘the originator’ of justice. However for the time being, we shall focus on these two core principles of Confucianist Justice, the identity principle of ren “which allows holistic rights of humanity to be realized by basic rights and liberties” and the difference principle of yi , “which requires individual rights and justice to be determined in a system of positions befitting the merits and demerits of each and every person in the system” (ibid). The fundamental dichotomy that arises out of these two forces is again the harmony between opposing forces, the principle of ren can be translated to the humanizing force between humanity whereas the principle of yi would be the applied to the individual (in application of one’s action). This ‘convergence-point’ of essences creates the “principle of rectitude” (zhengyi) to be upheld by the public or all people” (353).

Plato
The story is, that Leonitus, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill of the fair sight.
-The Republic Book 4

(Wo)man is a dynamic-spectrum animal. In the capacity to be such an animal, the totality of action is encompassed from the totality of humanity that has existed (or can ever exist). The knowledge of both ‘good & evil’ encompass the (wo)man who has mastered the nature of self, of the segmented parts made to a whole. In book 4 of the series On the Republic (ancient title On Justice) (Stanford, 2020), Plato mentions the segments of spirit, reason, and appetite, in constant motion, struggle; this again leads to the production of human nature as one which exists as a point (of individual) upon a spectrum (of the total humanity), with the point being, of the individual to become (encompass) the spectrum. The greatest analysis that this paper can reference in regards to this definition is that of Professor Andrew Domanski, in The quest for justice in Plato’s Republic, he states,
Socrates’s definition, as portrayed in these statements, looks disarmingly simple. Simple it is, but not shallow(..) first, these definitions show that Socratic justice is rooted in human nature. It follows that Socratic justice is indissolubly linked to natural law: violation of one is violation of the other. Secondly, an element common to these formulations is human activity, whether of mind or of body. The Socratic concept of justice therefore contemplates human beings in action (350).

This again reiterates the dynamic nature of justice, of justice as an action, justice as a telos. Justice becomes the sine qua non of existence, and is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all
virtue (ibid). The constant ongoing configuration of essence (toward rectification) is justice. This translates well into the argument proposed by this paper on the commensurability of concept, as the nature of justice is again seen as a teleological mechanism, in such that it is through the application (of justice) the human-person (and then by extension, the polis) becomes “realized”. Professor Klarjic proposes this very paradigm in, Justice as the Fundamental Value and as the Essence of Plato’s State, he concludes that,
Justice as the basic virtue would secure, in its actual implementation, a state of social which the identity of the citizen and of his city polis should be realized through the realization of good and of justice ( 275).
“Justice as a base” would allow for any human-person to ascend toward the correct proportions of human-zenith. With the existential attribute being located in capacity of any human-person, of whom, is able to properly order such. The proper order, or rather the merit of each, in possession of what is best suited for itself, is the thought of justice imparted masterfully through The Republic.

The Philosopher- King and the Junzi
“The practice of becoming a ‘Junzi’ and of successfully cultivating ‘ren’ thus involves striking the proper balance between social forms and individual participation” (Slingerland, p. 108). This is one of the rather proficient cross-overs of commensurability between the two authors, in such that the tools of justice are harnessed by a “philosopher-king’/ junzi; or rather one who has mastered the knowledge of balancing the segmented parts/relationships (via learning). This author is entitled the Junzi (exemplary persons) in the Confucian cosmology of justice/human nature (M. Sim, p 202) and again uses the mechanisms of justice as a telos to the state of rectification. The notion of “parts in perfection of the whole” is the fundamental vibration set forth by Plato and Confucius throughout the totality of their logos, as is attained to a philosopher-king/junzi. Crafted from the same fabric of logos, the notion of
knowledge required to be such a exemplar is of the same dynamically (balanced) nature. Professor Derek Cross sums it as such,
“The attributes of the philosopher king, then, are those of the good judge and guardian combined: knowledge of good and evil, rule, and concern for the whole. All of these
are second-order attributes. It seems clear, then, that if the philosopher-king has wisdom, he will have wisdom of a second-order variety. This means, for all practical purposes, that the wisdom of the philosopher-king is the knowledge of good and evil” (p. 90/156).

This total encapsulation of epistemology to include both “evil” and the total action-capacity of, is a core facet which goes often overlooked within contemporary mechanisms of (epistemology). This is another remarkable bridge (intra/inter-structurally) in such that the (balanced) knowledge of the total (good/evil) allows the philosopher/junzi to craft epistemic thought and action, bypassing contextual boundaries.
Of greater weight placed by both authors is the methodology of ascertaining the state of philosopher-king/junzi. in the Confucian line of logic, it is a “project of self-cultivation”, as professor Slingerland mentions in Virtue Ethics, the Analects, and the Problem of Commensurability,
The Confucian project of self-cultivation, aimed at producing an individual (the “gentleman” or “sage”) endowed with the virtue of ren, involves a strict regimen of training in which the individual subordinates himself to traditional standards of practice and judgment. This training advances along two main fronts: ritual practice (li) and study (xue). After extended training in these practices, the emotions are ultimately harnessed to produce moral behavior. Study and thinking must be properly balanced (Analects 2.15, p 102).
It is of important note that ritual practice (li) does not involve simple recantation of archaic ritual, but works rather as a ‘formative tool of a mechanical nature’. Professor Slingerland concludes upon this topic stating that li “were understood to require an emotional commitment on part of the practitioner”
(…) “to achieve the proper balance between zhi (native substance) and wen ( acquired refinement) to avoid being an uncouth brute or an affected pendant” (ibid). The concept of dynamic balance is the greatest cross-over between the two theorems. As per the following methodological quote by Confucius, the balance required to be such a person is cemented on this matter thusly,
‘When native substance overwhelms cultural refinement, the result is a crude rustic. When cultural refinement overwhelms native substance, the result is a foppish pedant. Only when culture and native substance are perfectly mixed and balanced do you have a gentleman (6.18).
Via the mechanism of learning, Confucius states that it is “ by learning that a self-cultivating person reaches the Dao” (Cheng’s Translation, p. 349). This self-ordering is concurrently stressed throughout Platonic (and Confucian) thought, as modus operandi. As expressed by Professor Domanski, with taking this viewership, one “goes beyond the one-sided and fatally flawed modern notion of training only the mind or intellect” (348). In direct symmetry to the telos produced by Confucius, Professor Domanski concludes that, “it is implicit in Plato’s treatment of temperance that education must extend to the whole person, to character as much as to intellect” (ibid).

Conclusion:
To bring about a synthesis to the thesis in correlation to the referenced authors, Justice as a concept, as codified by Plato and Confucius, is of similar telos and definition across contextual boundaries as it is within (said boundaries). This argument is deduced using the nature of Justice set- forth as transitional, transformative, extrinsic, and of instrumental capacity. In the understanding of the ‘dynamic merit’ required of Plato one translates the concept over in Confucian logic as that of the ‘right- relationship’ and appropriate action (yi). The concept of Philosopher-King and the Junzi are also of great camaraderie, as both require the encompassment of the spectrum of the total-being of all action, the knowledge of “good and evil”, in balance. The knowledge of (ren) encompasses just that, the complete human, a heuristic human-nature. This paper would like to conclude using a proposition set forth by Professor Domanski in regards to the dismantling of these false binaries of commensurability, stating,
Most modem jurists would have us believe that justice and natural law are relative, subjective- notions. Relativistic doctrines of law and justice have much to answer for: they must be held at least partly responsible for the unhappiness, dishonesty, uncertainty and moral confusion which surround us in the late twentieth century. Now, with the tum of the millennium almost upon us, the time has surely come to discard these relativistic notions and enthrone in their place Plato’s values of absolute truth and absolute justice. These values lie as much at the heart of the Advaita Vedanta philosophy of ancient India, and of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, as at the heart of the Platonic teaching. (…) (337).
Professor Domanski brings in other commensurability of comparisons, but the the logic remains unchanged, to bind concept within space and time is a disservice to the very notion of concept. It is a epistemic source, a base virtue, a ‘power which telos all other virtue. As demonstrated by both Plato and Confucius, the teleological nature of justice deceives its source from the (total) purity of concept, of which, is reached by any whom is capable to “order ones essence” in “appropriate proportion”. The pairing of such essences in merit to their nature allows for the human-person to not only cross- contextual boundaries of time & space, but the very ontology of human-nature itself.

Bibliography

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